Posts Tagged ‘EIFT’

Why Do We Need Physical Acquisition?

Thursday, June 25th, 2015

With all the trouble of jailbreaking iOS 8 devices and the lack of support for 64-bit hardware, does iOS physical acquisition still present meaningful benefits to the investigator? Is it still worth your time and effort attempting to acquire that iPhone via a Lightning cord?

Granted, jailbroken iOS devices are rare as hen’s teeth. You are very unlikely to see one in the wild. However, we strongly believe that physical acquisition still plays an important role in the lab, and here are the reasons why.

  1. Apple’s current privacy policy explicitly denies government information requests if the device in question is running iOS 8. This means that handing over the device to Apple will no longer result in receiving its full image if the device is running iOS 8.x (source: https://www.apple.com/privacy/government-information-requests/)
  2. In many countries (Mexico, Brazil, Russia, East Europe etc.) Apple sells more 32-bit phones than 64-bit ones. Old iPhones traded in the US are refurbished and sold to consumers in other countries (BrightStar coordinates these operations for Apple in the US). As an example, new and refurbished iPhone 4S and 5 units accounted for some 46% of all iPhones sold through retail channels in Russia in Q1 2015.
  3. Physical extraction returns significantly more information compared to any other acquisition method including logical or over-the-air acquisition. In particular, we’re talking about downloaded mail and full application data including logs and cache files (especially those related to Internet activities). A lot of this information never makes it into backups.
  4. Full keychain extraction is only available with physical acquisition. Physical is the only way to fully decrypting the keychain including those records encrypted with device-specific keys. Those keychain items can be extracted from a backup file, but cannot be decrypted without a device-specific key. In addition, the keychain often contains the user’s Apple ID password.
  5. With physical acquisition, you can extract the ‘securityd’ (0x835) from the device. This key can be used to completely decrypt all keychain items from iCloud backups.
  6. Physical acquisition produces a standard DMG disk image with HFS+ file system. You can mount the image into the system and use a wider range of mobile forensic tools to analyze compared to iTunes or iCloud backup files.

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Apple’s Take on Government Surveillance: On Its Customers’ Side

Tuesday, January 27th, 2015

Everyone must comply with government requests to disclose information. How far should one go when disclosing such information? This is up to the company. In a recent trend, several big IT companies including Apple, Facebook, Google and Microsoft among others teamed up to propose a change in US legislatures concerning governments spying on its citizens. The reform would make government surveillance “consistent with established global norms of free expression and privacy and with the goals of ensuring that government law enforcement and intelligence efforts are rule-bound, narrowly tailored, transparent, and subject to oversight”.

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Elcomsoft Phone Password Breaker Enhances iCloud Forensics and Speeds Up Investigations

Thursday, August 22nd, 2013

It’s been a while since we updated Elcomsoft Phone Password Breaker, dedicating our efforts to physical acquisition of iOS devices instead. Well, now when the new iOS Forensic Toolkit is out, it is time to update our classic phone recovery tool.

The new version of Elcomsoft Phone Password Breaker is released! While you can read an official press-release to get an idea of what’s new and updated, you may as well keep reading this blog post to learn not only what is updated, but also why we did it.

Dedicated to iCloud Forensics

This new release is more or less completely dedicated to enhancing support for remote recovery of iOS devices via iCloud. Why do it this way?

Because iCloud analysis remains one of the most convenient ways to acquire iOS devices. You can read more about iCloud analysis in a previous post here. Let’s see what else is available.

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The New Elcomsoft iOS Forensic Toolkit

Wednesday, July 17th, 2013

Soon after releasing the updated version of iOS Forensic Toolkit we started receiving questions about the new product. Did we really break iPhone 5? Does it truly work? Are there limitations, and what can you do about them? We decided to assemble all these questions into a small FAQ. If you’d rather read the full, more technical version of this FAQ, visit the following page instead: Elcomsoft iOS Forensic Toolkit FAQ. Those with non-technical background please read along.

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New Features in EPPB

Thursday, April 5th, 2012

When it comes to adding new features to our products we try to focus on our customers’ needs and it is my pleasure today to announce a preview (or beta) version of our Phone Password Breaker tool with new features requested (or inspired) by our valued customers users :)

Here’s the wrap-up of new features.

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Mobile password keepers don’t keep the word

Friday, March 16th, 2012

We’ve analyzed 17 popular password management apps available for Apple iOS and BlackBerry platforms, including free and commercially available tools, and discovered that no single password keeper app provides a claimed level of protection. None of the password keepers except one are utilizing iOS or BlackBerry existing security model, relying on their own implementation of data encryption. ElcomSoft research shows that those implementations fail to provide an adequate level of protection, allowing an attacker to recover encrypted information in less than a day if user-selectable Master Password is 10 to 14 digits long.

The Research

Both platforms being analyzed, BlackBerry and Apple iOS, feature comprehensive data security mechanisms built-in. Exact level of security varies depending on which version of Apple iOS is used or how BlackBerry users treat memory card encryption. However, in general, the level of protection provided by each respective platform is adequate if users follow general precautions.

The same cannot be said about most password management apps ElcomSoft analyzed. Only one password management app for the iOS platform, DataVault Password Manager, stores passwords in secure iOS-encrypted keychain. This level of protection is good enough by itself; however, that app provides little extra protection above iOS default levels. Skipping the complex math (which is available in the original whitepaper), information stored in 10 out of 17 password keepers can be recovered in a day – guaranteed if user-selectable master password is 10 to 14 digits long, depending on application. What about the other seven keepers? Passwords stored in them can be recovered instantly because passwords are either stored unencrypted, are encrypted with a fixed password, or are simply misusing cryptography.

Interestingly, BlackBerry Password Keeper and Wallet 1.0 and 1.2 offer very little protection on top of BlackBerry device password. Once the device password is known, master password(s) for Wallet and/or Password Keeper can be recovered with relative ease.

In the research we used both Elcomsoft Phone Password Breaker and Elcomsoft iOS Forensic Toolkit.

Recommendations

Many password management apps offered on the market do not provide adequate level of security. ElcomSoft strongly encourages users not to rely on their advertised security, but rather use iOS or BlackBerry built-in security features.

In order to keep their data safe, Apple users should set up a passcode and a really complex backup password. The unlocked device should not be plugged to non-trusted computers to prevent creation of pairing. Unencrypted backups should not be created.

BlackBerry users should set up a device password and make sure media card encryption is off or set to “Encrypt using Device Key” or “Encrypt using Device Key and Device Password” in order to prevent attackers from recovering device password based on what’s stored on the media card. Unencrypted device backups should not be created.

The full whitepaper is available at http://www.elcomsoft.com/WP/BH-EU-2012-WP.pdf