Since the introduction of DPAPI in Windows 2000, the forensic workflow for recovering browser credentials was straightforward: isolate the computer, image the drive, and extract the browser profile. In that era, having the user’s Windows password was enough to decrypt everything offline. Today, that assumption is outdated. With the shift to App-Bound Encryption, Google and Microsoft effectively broke the “dead box” workflow for their browsers. While stored passwords remain critical evidence, accessing them now requires investigators to act before they pull the plug.

How web browsers protect stored passwords

Until recently, the industry standard was the Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI). DPAPI was used in Chrome, Edge, and most Chromium-based browsers to secure the SQLite databases containing passwords (Login Data) and cookies. DPAPI relies on a simple premise: “User-Bound” security. The operating system encrypts data using keys linked to the user’s login credentials. If you are logged in as the user, or if a forensic tool has the user’s password, decrypting the database is trivial.

In this legacy model, if an investigator (or attacker) obtained a disk image but did not have the user’s password, the data remained encrypted. DPAPI ties the data to the user credentials, so breaking the user’s Windows account password remained an essential step. If the password was known, however, offline extractions were easy. It also meant any malware running as the user could dump the same data without administrative privileges.

Google closed this gap in July 2024 with Chrome 127, introducing App-Bound Encryption – a feature initially protecting cookies, with the architecture designed to extend to passwords and payment data. Microsoft Edge (version 127+) followed suit immediately, as it shares the Chromium core. This new model shifts the security boundary from the user to the application. Now, instead of relying solely on the user’s identity, the browser binds the encryption keys to the application’s identity—specifically the binary on the disk. Chrome utilizes a privileged helper service, the Elevation Service, running with SYSTEM privileges to handle encryption key operations. When the browser needs to decrypt the database key, it sends a request to this system service, which verifies that the request originates from a legitimate, signed chrome.exe binary. Because the decryption key is managed by a system-level service that strictly validates the caller, a third-party forensic tool running as the user cannot successfully ask the OS to decrypt the data. The request will fail because the requesting tool is not the verified browser executable.

The forensic implication for App-Bound Encryption is a broken workflow for traditional tools. “Run and dump” utilities relying on standard DPAPI calls fail on Chrome 127+ profiles, extracting only encrypted blobs they cannot decrypt. This model protects against external processes, but does not protect against threats inside the authorized process. Malicious extensions or code injected directly into the chrome.exe memory space inherit the browser’s trusted identity, effectively bypassing App-Bound Encryption.

The browser market is now split. Chrome, Edge, and several other Chromium-based web browsers enforce this strict App-Bound Encryption. In contrast, Mozilla Firefox uses its own encryption system (NSS/Network Security Services) and doesn’t use DPAPI in the same way. The “master password” (now called “Primary Password”) is optional.

The extraction dilemma: dead box vs. live system analysis

This split creates a critical dilemma for the investigator. If you rely solely on traditional disk imaging (“dead box” analysis), you will hit a wall with modern Chrome and Edge profiles. Even with the correct Windows password, you cannot decrypt the App-Bound keys offline because the required system service and the verified browser process are not running. The data remains an encrypted blob.

For Firefox, or older Chromium versions, dead-box analysis still works perfectly. But for the majority of modern targets, extraction must happen on the live system. Yet, simply running a tool on a live machine is no longer enough. Standard forensic tools running as the user cannot ask Windows to decrypt the data, because the App-Bound service sees them as “unauthorized applications” and blocks the request.

How we extract stored passwords

This is where Elcomsoft Quick Triage comes in. Until recently, the only practical automated method to bypass App-Bound Encryption was code injection – a technique still utilized by several third-party tools (such as xaitax). This approach involves launching the browser (in suspended mode) and executing code within its memory space to mimic the trusted identity. While effective, it is an invasive measure that was a necessary compromise, as alternative manual methods were far too labor-intensive or technically demanding for rapid triage.

With Elcomsoft Quick Triage, we have eliminated this compromise. Our tool now employs a smart workaround capable of decrypting the App-Bound key without launching the original web browser or injecting foreign code. This implementation is just as fast and practical as the injection-based method but significantly cleaner, allowing investigators to recover credentials without the forensic risks associated with manipulating live browser processes.

Conclusion

App-Bound Encryption turns the simple act of powering down a suspect’s computer into a potential destroyer of evidence. Traditional disk imaging can no longer recover credentials from modern Chromium browsers. To secure this data, investigators must perform forensic triage during the live session, using tools that can actively navigate these new application-level defenses.

References:

• xaitax/Chrome-App-Bound-Encryption-Decryption
• Bypassing “app-bound” encryption implemented by Google Chrome | Devoteam