Cloud acquisition has been available for several years. iPhones and iPads running recent versions of iOS can store snapshots of their data in the cloud. Cloud backups are created automatically on a daily basis provided that the device is charging while connected to a known Wi-Fi network. While iCloud backups are great for investigations, there is one thing that might be missing, and that’s up-to-date information about user activities that occurred after the moment the backup was created. In this article, we’ll discuss an alternative cloud acquisition option available for iOS devices and compare it to the more traditional acquisition of iCloud backups.
Posts Tagged ‘Elcomsoft Phone Breaker’
Two-factor authentication a roadblock when investigating an Apple device. Obtaining a data backup from the user’s iCloud account is a common and relatively easy way to acquire evidence from devices that are otherwise securely protected. It might be possible to bypass two-factor authentication if one is able to extract a so-called authentication token from the suspect’s computer.
Authentication tokens are used by iCloud Control Panel that comes pre-installed on macOS computers, as well as iCloud for Windows that can be installed on Windows PCs. Authentication tokens are very similar to browser cookies. They are used to cache authentication credentials, facilitating subsequent logins without asking the user for login and password and without prompting for secondary authentication factors. Authentication tokens do not contain the user’s password, and not even a hash of the password. Instead, they are randomly generated sequences of characters that are used to identify authorized sessions.
Tip: The use of authentication tokens allows bypassing two-factor authentication even if no access to the secondary authentication factor is available.
The previous article was about the theory. In this part we’ll go directly to practice. If you possess a turned on and locked iOS device and have no means of unlocking it with either Touch ID or passcode, you may still be able to obtain a backup via the process called logical acquisition. While logical acquisition may return somewhat less information compared to the more advanced physical acquisition, it must be noted that physical acquisition may not be available at all on a given device.
Important: Starting with iOS 8, obtaining a backup is only possible if the iOS device was unlocked with a passcode at least once after booting. For this reason, if you find an iPhone that is turned on, albeit locked, do not turn it off. Instead, isolate it from wireless networks by placing it into a Faraday bag, and do not allow it to power off or completely discharge by connecting it to a charger (a portable power pack inside a Faraday bag works great until you transfer the device to a lab). This will give you time to searching user’s computers for a lockdown record.
iCloud sync is everywhere. Your contacts and calendars, system backups and photos can be stored in the cloud on Apple servers. This time, we discovered that yet another piece of data is stored in the cloud for no apparent reason. Using an iPhone and have an active iCloud account? Your calls will sync with iCloud whether you want it or not. In fact, most users we’ve heard from don’t want this “feature”, yet Apple has no official way to turn off this behavior other than telling people “not using the same Apple ID on different devices”. What’s up with that? Let’s try to find out.
Why It Matters
Ever since the release of iOS 8, Apple declines government requests to extract information. According to Apple, “On devices running iOS 8 and later versions, your personal data is placed under the protection of your passcode. For all devices running iOS 8 and later versions, Apple will not perform iOS data extractions in response to government search warrants because the files to be extracted are protected by an encryption key that is tied to the user’s passcode, which Apple does not possess.”
So far, we had no reasons to doubt this policy. However, we’ve seen Apple moving more and more data into the cloud. iCloud data (backups, call logs, contacts and so on) is very loosely protected, allowing Apple itself or any third party with access to proper credentials extracting this information. Information stored in Apple iCloud is of course available to law enforcement. (more…)
We discovered a major security flaw in the iOS 10 backup protection mechanism. This security flaw allowed us developing a new attack that is able to bypass certain security checks when enumerating passwords protecting local (iTunes) backups made by iOS 10 devices.
The impact of this security weakness is severe. An early CPU-only implementation of this attack (available in Elcomsoft Phone Breaker 6.10) gives a 40-times performance boost compared to a fully optimized GPU-assisted attack on iOS 9 backups.
What’s It All About?
When working on an iOS 10 update for Elcomsoft Phone Breaker, we discovered an alternative password verification mechanism added to iOS 10 backups. We looked into it, and found out that the new mechanism skips certain security checks, allowing us to try passwords approximately 2500 times faster compared to the old mechanism used in iOS 9 and older.
This new vector of attack is specific to password-protected local backups produced by iOS 10 devices. The attack itself is only available for iOS 10 backups. Interestingly, the ‘new’ password verification method exists in parallel with the ‘old’ method, which continues to work with the same slow speeds as before.
By exploiting the new password verification mechanism, we were able to support it in our latest update, Elcomsoft Phone Breaker 6.10. Since this is all too new, there is no GPU acceleration support for the new attack. However, even without GPU acceleration the new method works 40 times faster compared to the old method *with* GPU acceleration. (more…)
FileVault 2 is a whole-disk encryption scheme used in Apple’s Mac OS X using secure XTS-AES encryption to protect the startup partition. Brute-forcing your way into a crypto container protected with a 256-bit key is a dead end.
FileVault 2 volumes can be unlocked with a password to any account with “unlock” privileges. We have tools (Elcomsoft Distributed Password Recovery) that can brute-force user passwords, which can also unlock the encrypted volume. However, this is still not easy enough and not fast enough. The result is not guaranteed either.
Today we’ll talk about decrypting FileVault 2 volumes without lengthy attacks by using FileVault 2 escrow keys extracted from the user’s iCloud account.
Releasing a major update of a complex forensic tool is always tough. New data locations and formats, new protocols and APIs require an extensive amount of research. Sometimes, we discover things that surprise us. Researching Apple’s iCloud Photo Library (to be integrated into Elcomsoft Phone Breaker 6.0) led to a particularly big surprise. We discovered that Apple keeps holding on to the photos you stored in iCloud Photo Library and then deleted, keeping “deleted” images for much longer than the advertised 30 days without telling anyone. Elcomsoft Phone Breaker 6.0 becomes the first tool on the market to gain access to deleted images going back past 30 days.
Update September 1, 2016: Apple is fixing this as we speak. Deleted photos still appear, but we see less and less of them in every session. Whatever it was, it seems like Apple is fixing the issue as quick as they can.
In the world of Windows dominance, Apple’s Mac OS X enjoys a healthy market share of 9.5% among desktop operating systems. The adoption of Apple’s desktop OS (macOS seems to be the new name) is steadily growing. This is why we are targeting Mac OS with our tools.
This time, let’s talk about Mac OS X user account passwords. Not only will a user password allow accessing their Mac, but it will also allow decrypting FileVault 2 volumes that are otherwise securely encrypted with virtually unbreakable XTS-AES.
Attacking FileVault 2
FileVault 2 is Apple’s take on whole-disk encryption. Protecting the entire startup partition, FileVault 2 volumes can be unlocked with either of the following:
- 256-bit XTS-AES key
- Recovery Key
- User password from any account with “unlock” privileges
There is also an additional unlock method available called Institutional Recovery Key. These recovery keys are created when system administrators enable FileVault 2 encryption with FileVaultMaster.keychain. This method requires additional steps to activate, and is typically used in organizations with centralized keychain management.
We have a bunch of mobile forensic tools. We have tools for extracting data from jailbroken iPhones and tools for decrypting password-protected backups. Tools for downloading data from iCloud and tools for analyzing user data mined by Google. We even have a tool for decrypting backups produced by BlackBerry 10, one of the most secure OS’es on the market.
We also have a tool for viewing all that data. Elcomsoft Phone Viewer was initially released as a tool to complement our range of mobile forensic tools. Initially, the tool’s sole purpose was enabling our users to view information they extracted using other tools from our range via physical, logical or over-the-air acquisition. Viewing all but unencrypted iTunes backups would require you launching Elcomsoft Phone Breaker to remove protection and decrypt information.
This is no longer the case. Starting with this release, you can use Elcomsoft Phone Viewer as a fully featured, stand-alone tool for accessing mobile data. What did we change and who can benefit from the new features? Read along to find out!