iOS Forensic Toolkit 10.13 extends agent-based extraction to iOS and iPadOS 26, currently from 26.0 through 26.7.3. The tool now supports all devices that can run iOS/iPadOS 26, including the iPhone 17 lineup and M5-based iPads. The method is a partial file system extraction. It returns the data of (mostly) third-party apps, while system data is mostly unreachable. Notably, the extraction agent can be sideloaded over the air, which makes extraction possible on iPhones with Stolen Device Protection turned on.
In consent-based cases the examiner knows the passcode and can unlock the device. Yet, two obstacles remain.
We addressed the pairing problem earlier by sideloading the extraction agent over the air (Sideloading the extraction agent: a Stolen Device Protection workaround); OTA installation needs no pairing. Until now, though, the agent could extract data only on iOS versions where we had kernel access.
The new extraction path relies on a sandbox escape. Exploits of this class are lighter than kernel exploits and are easier to implement. The agent escapes its own sandbox and reads the folders that hold app data:
/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/*
/var/mobile/Containers/Shared/AppGroup/*
/var/mobile/Containers/Data/InternalDaemon/*
/var/mobile/Containers/Data/PluginKitPlugin/*
The first two hold most of the evidence. Data/Application contains the private container of each app. Shared/AppGroup contains App Group containers: shared storage used by an app together with its extensions, or by several apps from one developer. Many apps keep their main databases there; Telegram is one of them, as well as X (Twitter), Facebook Messenger, Viber, WeChat, Outlook, Gmail, and so on, and so forth.
The method returns app data, while most system data stays out of reach.
| Extracted | Not extracted |
|---|---|
| Instant messengers: Telegram, WhatsApp, Threema etc | System databases, text messages, iMessage |
| Social networks: X (Twitter), Instagram, Threads, TikTok | Call log, contacts |
| Third-party email clients: Outlook, Gmail, etc. | System address book, stock Mail app |
| Financial, navigation and location apps | Camera roll, Maps |
| Apple Notes (may contain saved passwords) | Keychain |
Some other Apple data stored in App Group containers may also be present. How much exactly depends on what analysis tools learn to parse.
Extended logical acquisition fills most of the gaps. It returns the complete photo library, a copy of the keychain, media, shared files and logs. When the device can be paired, use both methods. The order does not matter. Both methods are safe, and an examiner who knows the passcode can unlock the device if it reboots.
The right method depends on the OS version and on whether the device can be paired.
Containers are stored in folders named by UUID, and the folder name says nothing about the owning app. Most analysis tools identify the owner by reading .com.apple.mobile_container_manager.metadata.plist, a small file inside each container that records its identifier.
The agent extracts this file from Data/Application containers. In Shared/AppGroup containers it lacks the permissions to read it. The data in those containers is extracted in full; only the metadata file is missing.
Tools that depend on the metadata file may skip App Group data. In our tests, one popular analysis tool did not see Telegram data at all. Telegram keeps its chats, contacts and calls in its App Group container. An older version of another popular tool failed the same way, while its current version parses the extraction without the file. In one test case, adding the missing metadata files raised the number of Telegram records from a few hundred to more than a hundred thousand. Device-wide totals for messages, contacts and calls grew as well, since much of that data came from Telegram.
There are other ways to map container folders to apps, so check whether your tool shows data from App Group containers before relying on its results. For background on App Groups and their metadata files, see iOS Application Groups & Shared data on Swift Forensics.
We made a small utility that recreates the missing metadata files. It writes each file into the corresponding app’s container in the form it would have on the same device after a full file system extraction. Download it here:
Download iOS Container Metadata Builder
A file is written only after two independent confirmations of the owning app. Sources of confirmation include:
com.apple.LaunchServices-*.csstore) that links the App Group identifier to the app;Data/Application container.Containers without enough confirmation are marked “unconfirmed”.
It’s rather simple:
DELETE ADDED FILES removes everything the utility wrote, basically returning the file system to its original, as-extracted, state. The button works only during the current session until the program is closed.
The generated files carry no mark that sets them apart from originals. After the utility runs, the extraction contains files the agent did not extract from the device. Record this in the case notes:
A simpler, command-line only version of the utility will be available on GitHub as Python source code. We see it as a temporary measure. Once analysis tools identify containers by more reliable means and support partial file system extractions directly, the utility will no longer be needed.
iOS Forensic Toolkit 10.13 extracts app data from every iPhone and iPad running iOS/iPadOS 26.0 through 26.7.3, including iPhones with Stolen Device Protection. Combine it with extended logical acquisition whenever the device can be paired. Before relying on the results, check that your analysis tool recognizes App Group containers, and use iOS Container Metadata Builder if it does not.
Extract critical evidence from Apple iOS devices in real time. Gain access to phone secrets including passwords and encryption keys, and decrypt the file system image with or without the original passcode. Physical and logical acquisition options for all 64-bit devices running all versions of iOS.
Elcomsoft iOS Forensic Toolkit official web page & downloads »