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Posts Tagged ‘iPhone’

Using iOS 11.2-11.3.1 Electra Jailbreak for iPhone Physical Acquisition

Tuesday, July 10th, 2018

It’s been fast. iOS 11.3.1 and all earlier versions of the system down to iOS 11.2 have been successfully jailbroken. In addition, the jailbreak is compatible with iOS 11.4 beta 1 through 3. We normally wouldn’t post about each new jailbreak release; however, this time things are slightly different. The new Electra jailbreak uses two different exploits and presents two very different installation routines depending on whether or not you have a developer account with Apple. Considering how much more stable the developer-account exploit is compared to the routine available to the general public, this time it pays to be an Apple developer.

We tested the Electra jailbreak and can confirm that iOS Forensic Toolkit 4.0 is fully compatible. File system imaging and keychain extraction work; no OpenSSH installation required as Electra includes an SSH client listening on port 22.

Why Jailbreak?

For the general consumer, jailbreak is one open security vulnerability calling for trouble. Apple warns users against jailbreaking their devices, and there is much truth in their words.

Forensic experts use jailbreaks for much different reasons compared to enthusiast users. A wide-open security vulnerability is exactly what they want to expose the device’s file system, circumvent iOS sandbox protection and access protected data. Jailbreaking extract the largest set of data from the device. During jailbreaking, many software restrictions imposed by iOS are removed through the use of software exploits.

In addition to sandboxed app data (which includes conversation histories and downloaded mail), experts can also extract and decrypt the keychain, a system-wide storage for online passwords, authentication tokens and encryption keys. Unlike keychain items obtained from a password-protected local backup, physical extraction of a jailbroken device gains access to keychain items secured with the highest protection class ThisDeviceOnly (this is how).

The New Electra Jailbreak

Jailbreaking iOS versions past 11.1.2 (for which a Google-discovered vulnerability was published along with a proof-of-concept tool) was particularly challenging but not impossible. At this time, a team of jailbreakers discovered not one but two different vulnerabilities, releasing two versions of Electra jailbreak. Why the two versions?

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Protecting Your Data and Apple Account If They Know Your iPhone Passcode

Tuesday, June 12th, 2018

This publication is somewhat unusual. ElcomSoft does not need an introduction as a forensic vendor. We routinely publish information on how to break into the phone, gain access to information and extract as much evidence as theoretically possible using hacks (jailbreaks) or little known but legitimate workarounds. We teach and train forensic experts on how to extract and decrypt information, how to download information from iCloud with or without the password, how to bypass two-factor authentication and how their iPhone falls your complete victim if you know its passcode.

This time around we’ll be playing devil’s advocate. We’ll tell you how to defend your data and your Apple account if they have your iPhone and know your passcode.

iOS Devices Are Secure

We praised the iOS security model on multiple occasions. Speaking of the current pack of iOS versions (including iOS 11.4 release, 11.4.1 public beta and 12.0 first developer beta), we have full-disk encryption with decryption keys derived from the user’s passcode and protected by Secure Enclave. Thanks to the iOS keychain, we enjoy the additional layer of protection for our passwords and other sensitive information. If you protected your iPhone with a 6-digit passcode (which you really should, and which is the default since at least iOS 10), most of your information is securely encrypted until you first unlock your iPhone after it completes the boot sequence. Even if they take the memory chip off, they won’t get anything meaningful due to the encryption. (more…)

iOS 11.4 to Disable USB Port After 7 Days: What It Means for Mobile Forensics

Tuesday, May 8th, 2018

UPDATE June 2, 2018: USB Restricted Mode did not make it into iOS 11.4. However, in iOS 11.4.1 Beta USB Restricted Mode Has Arrived

A new iOS update is about to roll out in the next few weeks or even days. Reading Apple documentation and researching developer betas, we discovered a major new security feature that is about to be released with iOS 11.4. The update will disable the Lightning port after 7 days since the device has been last unlocked. What is the meaning of this security measure, what reasons are behind, and what can be done about it? Let’s have a closer look.

USB Restricted Mode in iOS 11.4

In the iOS 11.4 Beta, Apple introduced a new called USB Restricted Mode. In fact, the feature made its first appearance in the iOS 11.3 Beta, but was later removed from the final release. This is how it works:

“To improve security, for a locked iOS device to communicate with USB accessories you must connect an accessory via lightning connector to the device while unlocked – or enter your device passcode while connected – at least once a week.”

The functionality of USB Restricted Mode is actually very simple. Once the iPhone or iPad is updated to the latest version of iOS supporting the feature, the device will disable the USB data connection over the Lightning port one week after the device has been last unlocked. (more…)

What’s New in iOS 11 Security: the Quick Reference Guide

Thursday, December 21st, 2017

iOS 11 introduced multiple changes to its security model. Some of these changes are highly welcome, while we aren’t exactly fond of some others. In this quick reference guide, we tried to summarize all the changes introduced by iOS 11 in the security department.

Compared to iOS 10 and earlier versions of the system, iOS 11 introduced the following security changes:

–  Reset password to local backups (passcode required), which makes logical acquisition trivial

–  For 2FA accounts, reset Apple ID password and change trusted phone number with just device passcode (possible for both iOS 11 and iOS 10)

–  Health data sync with iCloud (users can disable)

+  Passcode required to establish trust relationship with a PC (Touch ID/Face ID can no longer be used to pair)

+  Quickly and discretely disable Touch ID/Face ID via S.O.S. mode

+  Automatically call emergency number (push side button 5 times in rapid succession)

+  iOS 11 strongly suggests enabling Two-Factor Authentication in multiple places

+  Two-Step Verification (2SV) is no longer available

Additionally, in macOS High Sierra, Desktop and Documents folders now sync with iCloud (user can disable).

The art of iOS and iCloud forensics

Thursday, November 2nd, 2017
  • The rise and fall of physical acquisition
  • Jailbreak to the rescue
  • In the shade of iCloud
  • iCloud Keychain acquisition hits the scene

iOS 11 has arrived, now running on every second Apple device. There could not be a better time to reminiscent how iOS forensics has started just a few short years ago. Let’s have a look at what was possible back then, what is possible now, and what can be expected of iOS forensics in the future.

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Can You Unlock That iPhone?

Monday, October 30th, 2017

“Can you unlock that iPhone?” is one of the most common questions we hear on various events and from our customers. There is no simple answer, but more often than not some options are available.

Just a few years back, the most common question was “can you crack that password?” We are still being asked that every other day, but locked iPhones are now more abundant than unknown passwords. There is a simple explanation for that: the iPhone is an ultimate source of evidence. That, before we even mention the many urgent cases when the phone needs to be unlocked.

Cover all possible scenarios in one short article would not be possible; for (much) more details you are welcome to read our Smartphone forensics book that explores the topic in depth. Keep reading to see what can be done in some cases.

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iCloud Photo Library: All Your Photos Are Belong to Us

Thursday, August 25th, 2016

Releasing a major update of a complex forensic tool is always tough. New data locations and formats, new protocols and APIs require an extensive amount of research. Sometimes, we discover things that surprise us. Researching Apple’s iCloud Photo Library (to be integrated into Elcomsoft Phone Breaker 6.0) led to a particularly big surprise. We discovered that Apple keeps holding on to the photos you stored in iCloud Photo Library and then deleted, keeping “deleted” images for much longer than the advertised 30 days without telling anyone. Elcomsoft Phone Breaker 6.0 becomes the first tool on the market to gain access to deleted images going back past 30 days.

Update September 1, 2016: Apple is fixing this as we speak. Deleted photos still appear, but we see less and less of them in every session. Whatever it was, it seems like Apple is fixing the issue as quick as they can.

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Dealing with a Locked iPhone

Friday, April 15th, 2016

So you’ve got an iPhone, and it’s locked, and you don’t know the passcode. This situation is so common, and the market has so many solutions and “solutions” that we felt a short walkthrough is necessary.

What exactly can be done to the device depends on the following factors:

Hardware Generation

iphone2

From the point of view of mobile forensics, there are three distinct generations:

  1. iPhone 4 and older (acquisition is trivial)
  2. iPhone 4S, 5 and 5C (32-bit devices, no Secure Enclave, jailbreak required, must be able to unlock the device)
  3. iPhone 5S, 6/6S, 6/6S Plus and newer (64-bit devices, Secure Enclave, jailbreak required, passcode must be known and removed in Settings)

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A Message to Our Customers, Apple and FBI

Thursday, February 18th, 2016

On Tuesday, a federal judge ordered Apple to assist the authorities in breaking into a locked iPhone 5C used by Syed Farook, who killed 14 in San Bernardino in December. According to the FBI, the phone might contain critical information about connections with Islamic terrorist groups. Apple opposed the motion and published an open letter at https://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ saying that “The United States government has demanded that Apple take an unprecedented step which threatens the security of our customers. We oppose this order, which has implications far beyond the legal case at hand.”

So what is the government asking, does Apple have it, and is it technically possible to achieve what they are asking? Let’s try to find out.

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Why Do We Need Physical Acquisition?

Thursday, June 25th, 2015

With all the trouble of jailbreaking iOS 8 devices and the lack of support for 64-bit hardware, does iOS physical acquisition still present meaningful benefits to the investigator? Is it still worth your time and effort attempting to acquire that iPhone via a Lightning cord?

Granted, jailbroken iOS devices are rare as hen’s teeth. You are very unlikely to see one in the wild. However, we strongly believe that physical acquisition still plays an important role in the lab, and here are the reasons why.

  1. Apple’s current privacy policy explicitly denies government information requests if the device in question is running iOS 8. This means that handing over the device to Apple will no longer result in receiving its full image if the device is running iOS 8.x (source: https://www.apple.com/privacy/government-information-requests/)
  2. In many countries (Mexico, Brazil, Russia, East Europe etc.) Apple sells more 32-bit phones than 64-bit ones. Old iPhones traded in the US are refurbished and sold to consumers in other countries (BrightStar coordinates these operations for Apple in the US). As an example, new and refurbished iPhone 4S and 5 units accounted for some 46% of all iPhones sold through retail channels in Russia in Q1 2015.
  3. Physical extraction returns significantly more information compared to any other acquisition method including logical or over-the-air acquisition. In particular, we’re talking about downloaded mail and full application data including logs and cache files (especially those related to Internet activities). A lot of this information never makes it into backups.
  4. Full keychain extraction is only available with physical acquisition. Physical is the only way to fully decrypting the keychain including those records encrypted with device-specific keys. Those keychain items can be extracted from a backup file, but cannot be decrypted without a device-specific key. In addition, the keychain often contains the user’s Apple ID password.
  5. With physical acquisition, you can extract the ‘securityd’ (0x835) from the device. This key can be used to completely decrypt all keychain items from iCloud backups.
  6. Physical acquisition produces a standard DMG disk image with HFS+ file system. You can mount the image into the system and use a wider range of mobile forensic tools to analyze compared to iTunes or iCloud backup files.

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