Using the Extraction Agent in 2026: Compatibility, Signing, Firewall, and Extraction Tips

May 11th, 2026 by Oleg Afonin

Over the years, we have published several articles about the extraction agent. However, the underlying technology changes quickly, and incremental changes often have significant cumulative effects. As a result, many of our older posts are no longer relevant and can be misleading if followed to the letter today. While last year’s recap, Installing and Troubleshooting the Extraction Agent (2025), remains a solid foundation for general setup, it does not account for the most recent hardware and software developments. This article serves as the definitive point of reference, providing an up-to-date recap of everything you need to know about the extraction agent as of May 2026.

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New Security Measures in iOS 11 and Their Forensic Implications

September 7th, 2017 by Oleg Afonin

Apple is about to launch its next-generation iOS in just a few days. Researching developer betas, we discovered that iOS 11 implements a number of new security measures. The purpose of these measures is better protecting the privacy of Apple customers and once again increasing security of device data. While some measures (such as the new S.O.S. sequence) are widely advertised, some other security improvements went unnoticed by the public. Let us have a look at the changes and any forensic implications they have.

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iOS 9.3.5 Physical Acquisition Made Possible with Phoenix Jailbreak

August 24th, 2017 by Oleg Afonin

If you watch industry news, you are probably aware of the new Phoenix jailbreak… or not. During the last several years, getting news about iOS jailbreaks from reliable sources became increasingly difficult. The sheer number of fake Web sites mimicking the look of well-known resources such as Pangu and TaiG made us extra careful when trying newly published exploits.

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How to Extract iCloud Keychain with Elcomsoft Phone Breaker

August 22nd, 2017 by Olga Koksharova

Starting with version 7.0, Elcomsoft Phone Breaker has the ability to access, decrypt and display passwords stored in the user’s iCloud Keychain. The requirements and steps differ across Apple accounts, and depend on factors such as whether or not the user has Two-Factor Authentication, and if not, whether or not the user configured an iCloud Security Code. Let’s review the steps one needs to take in order to successfully acquire iCloud Keychain.

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Acquiring Apple’s iCloud Keychain

August 22nd, 2017 by Oleg Afonin

Who needs access to iCloud Keychain, and why? The newly released Elcomsoft Phone Breaker 7.0 adds a single major feature that allows experts extracting, decrypting and viewing information stored in Apple’s protected storage. There are so many ifs and buts such as needing the user’s Apple ID and password, accessing their i-device or knowing a secret security code that one may legitimately wonder: what is it all about? Let’s find out about iCloud Keychain, why it’s so difficult to crack, and why it can be important for the expert.

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The Past and Future of iCloud Acquisition

August 21st, 2017 by Vladimir Katalov

In today’s world, everything is stored in the cloud. Your backups can be stored in the cloud. The “big brother” knows where you had lunch yesterday and how long you’ve been there. Your photos can back up to the cloud, as well as your calls and messages. Finally, your passwords are also stored online – at least if you don’t disable iCloud Keychain. Let’s follow the history of Apple iCloud, its most known hacks and our own forensic efforts.

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Attacking the 1Password Master Password Follow-Up

August 18th, 2017 by Vladimir Katalov

We received some great feedback on the original article about attacking master passwords of several popular password managers. In one discussion, our benchmark numbers for 1Password were questioned. We had no choice but to re-run the benchmarks and publish an updated chart along with some technical details and explanations. We bring our apologies to AgileBits, the developers of 1Password, for letting the wrong number creep in to our benchmark. Can we still break into 1Password by attacking the master password? Please bear with us for up-to-date information and detailed technical discussion.

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One Password to Rule Them All: Breaking into 1Password, KeePass, LastPass and Dashlane

August 10th, 2017 by Oleg Afonin

We’ve just updated Elcomsoft Distributed Password Recovery with the ability to break master passwords protecting encrypted vaults of the four popular password keepers: 1Password, KeePass, LastPass and Dashlane. In this article, we’ll talk about security of today’s password managers, and provide insight on what exactly we did and how to break in to encrypted vaults.

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Breaking Passwords in the Cloud: Using Amazon P2 Instances

August 1st, 2017 by Andrey Malyshev

Cloud services such as Amazon EC2 can quickly deliver additional computing power on demand. Amazon’s recent introduction of the a type of EC2 Compute Units made this proposition much more attractive than ever before. With Elcomsoft Distributed Password Recovery now supporting Amazon’s new P2 instances, each with up to 16 GPU units, users can get as much speed as they need the moment they need. In this article, we’ll discuss the benefits of using cloud compute units for password recovery, and provide a step-by-step guide on how to add virtual instances to Elcomsoft Distributed Password Recovery.

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Extract and Decrypt WhatsApp Backups from iCloud

July 20th, 2017 by Oleg Afonin

Facebook-owned WhatsApp is the most popular instant messaging tool worldwide. Due to its point-to-point encryption, WhatsApp is an extremely tough target to extract.

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WhatsApp: The Bad Guys’ Secret Weapon

July 19th, 2017 by Vladimir Katalov

WhatsApp is one of the most secure messengers with full end-to-end encryption. Messages exchanged between WhatsApp users are using an encrypted point-to-point communication protocol rendering man-in-the-middle attacks useless. WhatsApp communications are never stored or backed up on WhatsApp servers. All this makes government snooping on WhatsApp users increasingly difficult.

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